Know what actually ships. Prove it.

1. One holistic solution. SAST, SBOM, CVEs, and binary analysis in one report and one gate, instead of a stack of tools that contradict each other.
2. Accuracy. We report on code that is actually compiled and linked, so you are not triaging findings in code that never shipped.
3. The parts your own build list doesn't show. Vendored code, statically linked libraries, and transitive dependencies go missing even in well-run teams. Strig finds them because it watches what actually gets compiled and linked.
4. Evidence. Signed records tied to the exact binary you shipped. Run the same build again and the evidence matches.

More accurate, because we only analyze what is actually built.

• Reachability. We check compiled and linked code, so findings in code that never made it into the product are demoted or dropped.
• Exact code, not manifests. Our SCA identifies the actual compiled code snippets that shipped, rather than trusting a dependency manifest that says what should be there.

• One solution, not a stack. One report and one gate, instead of three tools whose reports your engineers have to reconcile.
• We see the actual build; they don't. Other tools scan the source tree or the binary and guess.
• Findings you can act on. We deprioritize or drop CVEs in code that never linked into the shipped binary. Other tools still report them, so you still have to triage.
• Some checks are only possible from the build. Build provenance, toolchain authenticity, modified vendored code, debug instrumentation left in a release. None of it is visible from source or binary alone.

Regulations like the CRA and sector frameworks turned software inventory from good practice into an obligation, including for products you already sold.

Evidence for programs across automotive, medical, industrial, rail, and embedded, including ISO 26262, IEC 62304, IEC 62443, EU CRA, FDA cybersecurity guidance, MISRA, and CWE, among others. We produce evidence for your assessor; we do not certify you. Don't see your framework? Tell us. Adding coverage is routine engineering work.

It is a holistic solution, so it can replace a fragmented stack, or it can be integrated alongside the tools you already run.

• We don't compete with AI, we feed it. AI cannot observe a build. We produce the ground truth it can't get: what was actually linked, the exact flags, build provenance, crashes from fuzzing real binaries. We are the sensor; AI is the analyst on top.
• Certification needs deterministic results. Same input, same result, every time, with a traceable reason. AI answers differently on different days and can hallucinate a CVE. You cannot block a release on that.
• Air-gapped builds need offline analysis. Your source cannot leave the premises, and AI tools lose most of their power without cloud models. On-prem and air-gapped deployments run fully offline. Strig blocks its own network access during a scan.

Three shifts at once:

• Compliance. The CRA and sector frameworks turned software inventory and vulnerability handling from good practice into an obligation, including for products you already sold.
• AI-generated code. Volume of code to review outpaced anyone's ability to account for what's in it.
• IoT. A step change in connected physical devices (thermostats, vehicles, medical devices, industrial controllers), each running embedded software with a long-lived attack surface.

No. Strig watches the build and records what happens. It does not change compiler flags, sources, or build steps.

Yes. The output is unchanged, with the same artifact hash. Strig observes and does not rewrite. We produce evidence that the observed build yielded the same artifact as the unobserved one.

The major C and C++ toolchains, with more on the way. Adding support for a compiler is routine engineering work. Tell us what you build with and we will confirm.

Any build system that invokes real compiler and linker commands, including Make, CMake, Bazel, Yocto, Ninja, and the rest. Strig captures what actually runs during the build. It does not care how those commands were orchestrated.

Seconds of overhead in the worst case. Strig records while your build runs; it does not add build steps.

No. Strig runs in parallel with your existing CI/CD, with no conflict and no intrusion into your process. You run the same build command under Strig: strig <build command>. No pipeline rewrite. Seconds of overhead in the worst case. Your pipeline gets a pass/fail exit code.

Yes. Strig fuzzes the binaries your build actually produces, not a source-level approximation. Crash results feed the same report and gate as SAST, SCA, and SBOM findings.

Depends on how you deploy. On-prem and air-gapped: everything stays in your network. SaaS: processed in Strig-managed infrastructure, configured to your requirements. Tell us your constraints and we will match them.

On-prem and air-gapped: nothing leaves your environment by design. SaaS: governed by your deployment agreement. We adjust to your requirements.

Yes, that is the design intent. The operational details (how vulnerability data updates arrive and how licensing is handled offline) are being finalized. We will confirm those specifics rather than guess at them.

Not only. If you still have the source and the toolchain for a past release, that release can be rebuilt under observation and produce evidence for the image that actually shipped. Where source or toolchain is gone, the value is forward-looking, from the next maintenance release onward.

An inventory of what is genuinely inside the shipped image, the known vulnerabilities affecting it, and a comparison against whatever inventory you hold today.